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D avid  H irsc h m a n n
I n  t h e  p e r io d  from  the mid-1960s to  the early 1970s, a num ber o f  w riters 
argued—generally along sim ilar lines— that Lesotho’s com prehensive depend­
ence upon its neighbour w ould leave the country’s political leaders with little, if  
any, alternative b u t to forge a policy o f friendly and peaceful coexistence w ith 
South Africa. T heir evaluation o f the extremely restrictive m ilieu in  which 
Lesotho’s foreign policy could operate, and their assessment o f the direction in 
w hich the ruling Basotho National Party  (BN P) was in fact m oving were both  
accurate. A lthough the altered course on which Prim e M inister Jonathan’s 
G overnm ent em barked towards the end o f  1971 certainly upset any prophetic 
com ponents o f  their analysis, it could scarcely have been anticipated. T his 
article is therefore not intended as a criticism (with the benefit o f  hindsight) o f 
these observations. R ather its purpose is threefold: to  suggest a possible set o f 
explanations for the  change in policy; to  engage in  a ‘ stock-taking ’ exercise on the 
content o f  tha t change; and to  place the change in  some sort o f perspective.
I
T h e  broad line o f reasoning applied by those writing on Lesotho— South 
Africa relations com menced by listing the  severe constraints on the independ­
ence o f the small kingdom , in  particular its almost unique predicam ent o f being 
surrounded totally by one country ; its complete reliance on South Africa for all 
com m unication w ith the outside world whether by rail, road, air or te le­
com m unications; the tigh t linkages o f the  Custom s U nion and the de facto  
m onetary un ion; and, m ost significantly, the large num ber o f Basotho who 
depended on the Republic for em ploym ent and  income. T hus Spence w rote o f 
the ‘Politics o f D ependence’, and W eisfelder o f a country ‘totally ensnared 
w ithin the South African sphere o f influence’, while H alpern  and Legum  used 
the  ‘hostage* state analogy.1
From this basic proposition they moved on to assert that Lesotho as a ‘ client 
state’ was strictly circumscribed in its foreign policy options, in particular in its 
relations with the Republic.2 Thus, a South African observer wrote that 
>
1. J. E. Spence, Lesotho. The Politics of dependence (London, 1968); R. F. Weisfelder, 
‘ Lesotho and South Africa: diverse linkages’, Africa Today, 18 ,2 ,1971 , p. 48; J. Halpern, 
South Africa's hostages: Basutoland, Bechuanalandy and Swaziland  (Harmondsworth, 
1965); and C. Legum, ‘Hazards o f  a free Basutoland’, Rand D aily M ail, Johannesburg, 
9 June 1966, p. 12.
2. G. S. Gilley, The foreign policy of the Kingdom of Lesotho (unpublished M A disserta­
tion, Southern Illinois University, 1969), p. 5.
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M aseru could simply not afford to ‘indulge in the luxury o f an irrational and 
em otional policy* towards Pretoria,3 and W cisfelder concluded that
. . .  any hope that this tiny black enclave will play a significant independent 
role requires considerable optim ism  and, possibly, a m easure of credulity .4 
In  addition to  the dependence o f  the ‘coun try ’ as such (to which the above 
w riters give attention) one would need to  focus on the extent to w hich the BN P 
itself and the interests it served were (and saw themselves as) reliant on and 
vulnerable to  the South African G overnm ent. A nd, domestically, in 
N olu tshungu’s term s, the specific ‘degree o f conservatism* m ust be seen to 
reflect ‘the social basis’ o f  the B N P ’s support, principally among the ‘traditional­
ist elem ents’ made up, in his view, o f  tribal chiefs, the white settlers (mostly 
traders), the Rom an Catholic C hurch  an d 'th e o ld c r  generationof scm i-litcratesV ' 
Such views were verified by the policy statem ents o f the BNP G overnm ent 
itself. T h e  P arty’s 1965 M anifesto stressed that it was ‘in  the interests o f the 
people’ to  cooperate w ith South Africa, while the  1970 M anifesto stated that five 
years o f  experience o f power ‘confirmed us in  our belief’ in the soundness o f this 
policy.® Jonathan expanded on this to  the U N  General Assembly in Septem ber 
1967,7 and H igh Commissioner J. R. L . Kotsokoane told an audience in London 
in  April 1969 that his country, having survived for 180 years, had no intention o f 
com m itting ‘national su icide’ th rough  bravado:
W e believe that economic cooperation and interracial consultation can dispel 
fear and bring about political detente.8
I I
Simply put, the case was argued that a specific economic condition (o f extreme 
dependence) resulted o f necessity in a particular foreign policy (of good ncigh- 
bourliness). In seeking an explanation for Lesotho’s modified approach one will 
not, however, find an answer in any variation in the fundam ental economic 
predicament o f the country: dependence pn South Africa has not been d im in­
ished. In terms o f  migrant labour, possibly the most crucial indicator, the 
situation has in fact deteriorated. In the years 1970-75, only 6,000 new jobs 
were created in Lesotho for a labour force which grew by 50,000 to 60,000, w ith 
the majority o f the additional unemployed finding work across the b o rd e r /’
3. A. J. van Wyk, Lesotho: a political study (Pretoria: The Africa Institute, 1967), p. 48.
4. W cisfeldcr, op. cit., p. 48.
5. S. C. Nolutshungu, South Africa and Africa. A  study in ideology and foreign policy 
(Manchester, 1975), p. 137. J. D . Holm , ‘Political stability in L esotho1, Africa Today, 
19, 4, 1972, pp. 3-16, takes note o f  the early indications of change in policy.
6. Manifesto of the Basotho National Party  (Maseru, 1965), p. 3, Foreign Relations 
para, e (ii) and (iii); and Basotho National P arty Manifesto for the 1970 M edians, Maseru, 
p. 4, relations with South Africa, para. b.
7. G illey, op. cit., p. 102,
8. J. R. L. Kotsokoane, ‘ Lesotho and her neighbours’, African Affairs, 68, 271, 10 o9, 
p. 138. Also see Speech by the Hon. the Prime Minister of Lesotho moving the 1969,70 
Development Fund Estimates of revenue and expenditure (Maseru, 1960 ), para. 7.
9. Kingdom o f  Lesotho, Second five-year development plan, Volume one, 1975 76-  
1979/80, Maseru, pp. 13 and 43.
T hus it was estim ated in 1975 that about 200,000 Lesotho citizens were working 
in  the Republic, as com pared w ith 27,000 in  paid em ploym ent inside Lesotho.10 
T hus the principal characteristic o f  the Lesotho economy as a labour reserve 
rem ained unaltered.
T h e  balance o f  trade— which is predom inantly w ith South Africa—also 
presents a bleak picture, as the following table shows:
Imports Exports Deficit 11 
1966 22-9 4-4 18-5 (Rand, m.)
1971 28 0 3 0 25-0 (Rand, m.)
1974 79 0 9-8 69-3 (Rand, m.)
T h e rapidly growing im port bill included a steady increase in  the purchase o f  
staple food requirem ents. Reliance on South African road, rail and air links 
continues, although a direct telecommunications connection has been estab­
lished w ith N airobi and aii, international airport is planned.
G overnm ent revenues have grown m arkedly, principally in  consequence o f  the 
com bined effects o f the operation o f the 1969 Customs U nion agreem ent and 
the raised wages o f m ine workers. N um erous projects, large and  small, 
governm ental and  parastatal, agricultural, industrial, educational and  infra­
structural, have been initiated am idst fast-growing donor in terest in  Lesotho. 
W hile it will take tim e to assess tlje overall im pact o f these undertakings, those 
trends which are apparent m anifest the  continuation o f all the m ajor elements o f  
a captive economy.
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One therefore has to seek further afield for possible explanations for the  shift 
in  policy. E ight reasons are suggested here: these are not o f course exclusive 
o f one ano ther; they are in  the m ain closely interlinked and m utually re ­
inforcing. T h e  first source o f disaffection arose from  the lim ited benefits 
realized from  the policy o f good neighbourliness, particularly in com parison 
w ith those anticipated. I t  had been expected in  M aseru tha t the South  African 
G overnm ent, appreciative o f Lesotho’s steps to  facilitate its outw ard m ovem ent 
into Africa, would provide substantial financial aid by way o f re tu rn . Jonathan 
—under severe criticism for. his approach both from  internal and external sources 
—needed as a m atter o f urgency to  dem onstrate its visible benefits. U nlike 
M alawi, which received capital aid, Lesotho gained no such favours. F u rth e r, 
the presence o f  South A frican seconded technical assistance personnel was
10. Lesotho papers for central and southern African regional conference on problems o f  
employment creation (Maseru; Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation, N ovem ­
ber 1975), p. 3.
11. S. M onsti, Brief review of plan implementation (Maseru: National Population 
Symposium, 1974), Table 2; further information provided by Bureau o f Statistics; see 
also Second Plan, op. c it.} p. 12. T he rapid increase must be attributed however partly 
to more comprehensive collection o f import data; see D . Hirschmann, ‘Administration o f  
planning in Lesotho: the second leg*, Development and Change^ forthcoming, 1978.
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proving dysfunctional to the BN P G overnm ent’s interests: while some were 
useful, m any were weak; in general they were insensitive to  the psychological 
and political needs of the leadership o f a new ly-independent African sta te ; and 
they were proving som ething o f an em barrassm ent both internally and externally. 
M arked disappointm ent was also registered at P retoria’s eventual refusal to 
purchase water (at a price satisfactory to  Lesotho) from  the proposed Oxbow - 
M alibam atso hydro-electric scheme. T hus the scheme, by far the largest 
proposal for Lesotho’s F irs t F ive Year Plan, fell through.
A related area which gave the Lesotho G overnm ent cause for reassessment 
involved certain steps taken by the South African Governm ent and South African 
interests, which showed either a total lack of concern for, or were in fact inimical 
to, M asuru’s economic developm ent objectives. Late in M arch 1969, for 
example, P retoria announced sweeping changes in tax structure w ith serious 
im plications for L esotho’s tax policies; in 1971 South Africa tightened im por- 
controls and devalued the  Rand— both w ithout consultation w ith its neighbours. 
In  1972 intervention by South African interests prevented a num ber o f invest­
m ents being located in L eso tho ;12 and in 1975, South Africa’s M inister o f 
Finance announced a devaluation o f  the Rand by a substantial 17-9 per cent, 
again w ithout warning—a step to which M aseru reacted sharply.13 A final 
illustration is the South African G overnm ent’s withdrawal in 1977 o f the long­
standing maize subsidy which raised prices o f this staple com modity for the 
Basotho.14 South Africa’s concurrence in a new Customs U nion agreem ent in 
1969 from which the Lesotho G overnm ent was to benefit considerably, as well 
as an agreement in 1974 to the paym ent o f com pensation for currency in circu­
lation inside Lesotho, have not counterbalanced disappointm ent at the paucity of 
Pretoria’s aid or indignation at the type o f economic action m entioned above.
T h e  th ird  explanation arises from  the operation of the policy o f apartheid 
itself. T he potential for South Africa’s domestic policies to serve as a continual 
source o f friction between the two governm ents may have been underestim ated 
by some o f the already m entioned earlier com mentaries on Lesotho. For 
Lesotho does not merely observe from  a distance the im plications o f race 
discrim ination, but large num bers o f its people daily experience its impact. 
W hile in the Republic, the working and living conditions o f the 200,000 or so 
Basotho m igrants arc comprehensively controlled by South Africa’s all- 
encompassing social and labour legislation. At a different level there are the 
num erous examples o f unequal treatm ent of Basotho at the border posts (despite 
‘w hite’ and ‘non-w hite’ signs having been removed, practice continues very 
m uch as before) and the barrage o f so-called ‘pe tty ’ hum iliations Basotho 
shoppers or visitors m ust suffer in  neighbouring South African towns. T he
12. ‘Rift grows between SA and L esotho’, Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 1 October 
1972, p. 10.
13. The Star, Johannesburg, 24 September 1975, p. 11. See also G. M. E. Lcistner, 
‘Devaluation and B L S ’, Africa Institute Bulletin, 13, 9/10, 1975, p. 338.
14. ‘ SA raises prices unilaterally’, Mochochouono, Maseru, 8 January 1977, p. 3.
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latter level, though more fragm entary and therefore less oppressive, directly  
impinges on the ruling class and may therefore be the m ore influential in  forging 
dom inant attitudes towards the Republic.
T h e n  there are sporadic incidents which (interspersed w ith the econom ic 
moves noted already) continually aggravate relations: the detention o f  Basotho 
a t Jan  Smvjts A irport in  Johannesburg; the extension o f the ‘ Bantustan m entality  ’ 
to delegations from  Lesotho by m eeting them  with officials o f th e  M in istry  o f 
Bantu A dm inistration;15 the kidnapping in  1972 o f a South African refugee, 
H erbert M balo, from  inside Lesotho (he was returned  im m ediately Lesotho 
objected);10 Bureau o f S tate Security activities in  Lesotho, the  latest allegation 
o f which was m ade by Lesotho in 1978 ;17 the shooting o f a young M osotho by a 
S outh  African policeman at Qacha’s N ek border post in  1973, and a sim ilar 
incident in 1977 ;18 the killing o f five Basotho m iners at W estern D eep Levels 
M ine in Septem ber 1973 (their funerals were attended by Lesotho’s P rim e 
M inister and  K ing);1? the death th rough  alleged carelessness o f South A frican 
prison officials o f a Lesotho citizen, M r Lawrence Sefatsa in the R ustenburg  
area, and  the detention o f another, M iss L im pho Sekamana, bo th  in 1977:20 
to nam e some o f the m ore significant examples.
Finally, in  this regard, the persistence o f all the fundam ental aspects o f  
apartheid  brought home to L esotho’s Prim e M inister that his initial hopes for 
peaceful progress in  the Republic were not going to be realized. T h u s the 
whole basis o f his case for dialogue, th a t is, that it w ould encourage the dis­
m antling o f the structures o f discrim ination, was steadily eroded. T h e  Soweto 
riots o f  June 1976 and the ensuing situation inside South Africa—continual 
•disturbances, police brutality, large-scale arrests, num erous unexplained deaths 
in  detention, including that o f Steve Biko, and the forging ahead w ith the 
B antustan policy (as witnessed by the T ranskei’s ‘independence’)— all seem ed 
to p u t a final seal on the argum ent for friendly contact as a m echanism  for non­
violent change.
T h e  fourth  m otivating factor for the G overnm ent’s modification in approach 
derives from  Lesotho’s internal political situation, and from  Jonathan’s struggle 
for domestic legitimacy. A lthough his BNP won the 1965 pre-independence
15. ‘ Rift grows between SA and L esotho’, op. cit.
16. ‘Probe into “gunpoint” kidnap’, Rand Daily M ail, 28 Novem ber 1972, p. 1; and 
‘ SA hands back refugee to L esotho’, The Star, 28 November 1972, p. 1.
17. ‘Relations with Lesotho near breaking point. MaSeru complains about BOSS and 
other activities’, Sunday Times, 17 June 1973, p. 3; Editorial, Lesotho Weekly, Maseru, 
3 September 1977, p. 1; and ‘Lesotho deports “BOSS agents’” , Rand D aily M ail, 17. 
March 1978, p. 2.
18. C. Legum, Africa contemporary record. Annual survey and documents, 1973-74  
(London, 1974), p. B380; Lesotho Interim National Assembly, Hansard, Second M eeting  
First Session, 2/10/73-17/10/73, pp. 201-2; and Lesotho Weekly, 16 April 1977, p. 3.' 
Jonathan told the Interim Assembly this was ‘not only an act of aggression against the 
sovereign state o f Lesotho but a virtual declaration o f war’.
19. ‘Botswana and Lesotho start mine enquiry’, The Star, 13 September 1973, p. 1; 
also see R. Leys, ‘ South African gold mining in 1974: the gold o f migrant labour’, 
African Affairs, 74, 295, 1975, pp. 196-208, particularly p. 203.
20. ‘ Repeated protests to South Africa’, Lesotho Weekly, 17 September 1977, p. 7.
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election taking thirty-one of the sixty seats, the opposition parties had received 
the majority o f votes. He found his Party opposed by more than half the voting 
population, by the more politicized and influential lowland and urban com­
m unities, by the K ing and by the senior echelons o f the civil service (in antici­
pation of a BCP victory, BCP mem bers had been groomed for the higher public 
service posts). I t would appear tha t the large majority o f Basotho mine workers 
were opposed to his party as well.21 Confronted w ith this situation, in circum ­
stances in which his capacity to improve the lot o f the Basotho was strictly 
lim ited, Jonathan faced an uphill battle for popular acceptance. T h is task 
was not cased by the BC P’s exploitation of every opportunity, w hether in local 
or foreign affairs, to weaken him whether in the form of hindering or dam aging 
development projects or of regular condemnation of his ties with Pretoria.
In  1965 the BN P had stressed the vital im portance of amiable working 
relations with the Republic, and the P arty’s success was attributed  partly to a 
fear among the Basotho (particularly the women) that a BCP victory would 
result in  suffering through loss o f employment opportunities in  South Africa. 
His decision to persist w ith the apparently  effective strategy o f using Pretoria 
as a prop to popularity proved to be an error. - Lack of ‘tangible payoffs’22 
weakened his position, while an underestim ation o f the people’s hostility to 
apartheid  enabled the BCP to monopolize the an ti-South  African cause; and he 
suffered politically in consequence^ T h e  P arty’s defeat in the 1970 elections, 
and Jonathan’s refusal to accept the results took a further heavy toll on his 
standing w ith the Basotho. T hus, as the BNP leadership recom m enced its 
drive for acceptance in the early 1970s it concluded that a more overtly hostile 
approach towards the Republic would be helpful. It would broaden the social 
basis o f its support, and dilute the B C P’s hold on this particular issue, so wooing 
voters to its side.
In addition to the problem s of gaining domestic legitimacy, Lesotho’s Prim e 
M inister had to strive for international— particularly African— acceptance. 
Before independence senior BCP officers, notably Ni.su M okhchle, had travelled 
in Africa and won support from  African leaders, while the OAU Liberation 
Com m ittee clearly indicated its preference for the BCP. Jonathan’s in ter­
national position was rendered the m ore problem atic by an active BCP campaign 
in African and European capitals, aimed at underm ining his credibility. He did 
not assist his cause by going further than necessary in explaining Lesotho’s 
predicam ent— periodically he would cajole African rulers for their lack of 
realism towards South Africa.22
As Lesotho’s leaders’ contacts with Africa grew (and as their perspectives on
21. See for example The perceptions and behaviour patterns of black mincworkers on a 
group gold mine, Issued by the Industrial Relations Department, Manpower Research 
Division, Anglo American Corporation o f South Africa, Johannesburg, November 197o, 
p. 2v.
22. Wcisfelder, op. cit., p. 53.
23. Sec K. W. Grundy, Confrontation and accommodation in Southern Africa (U . oi 
California P., 1973), pp. 118-124 and 133-6.
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international relations were broadened), they came to appreciate that the OAU 
and its m em ber countries were prepared to recognize the B N P and to  acknow­
ledge the country’s lim ited room for manoeuvre, bu t in re tu rn—the message was 
clear— the Jonathan G overnm ent should cease to em brace Pretoria quite as 
willingly as before. Accordingly, as it began to distance itself m ore openly from  
V orster’sX jovcrnm ent, so it received greater endorsem ent from  Africa, w ith a 
resultant steady erosion o f the im pact o f the BCP campaign. F or example, 
Lesotho was chosen to serve on the 1973 Ethiopia-Som alia dispute com m ission 
and the  1975 Angola com m ission; and 1975 saw the first visit by an OAU 
Secretary General to Lesotho.
In  addition to increasing exposure to the thinking o f African and  T h ird  W orld 
leaders, the influence o f num erous visiting missions concerned with political, 
economic and aid issues, and o f technical assistance personnel working in the 
country, has made some impact. T h u s in contrast w ith the unchanged struc­
tural dependence on tthc Republic, there has been a variation in  the  operating 
environm ent in which the ruling political-adm inistrative class functions. In  
this rather rarified atm osphere, South Africa’s predom inant presence has been 
dim inished, and replaced by personnel from  U N D P , Scandinavia, Africa, the  
U nited  States, Canada, etc., providing a clear sense o f  relief and release for the 
privileged who work w ithin it.
T h e  objective of securing a broader field o f donor interest in  Lesotho provides 
the  next explanation for the departure from  the early policy on South Africa. 
Im m ediately after independence Lesotho was almost totally dependent on 
Britain for capital aid, technical assistance personnel and fellowships. Assisted 
by a Central Planning Office (established in 1967) and later arm ed w ith its first 
five-year Developm ent P lan (published in 1970), Lesotho set ou t to a ttract 
donor interest. In  the ensuing negotiations and contacts the country’s repre­
sentatives came to sec tha t their initiatives would be helped by a m ore openly 
an ti-South  African stance. Jonathan’s call for aid to reduc cdependence on the 
Republic during his 1972 visit to D enm ark (where he secured a R2 m illion loan) 
indicated his growing appreciation o f  the link between foreign aid and  relations 
w ith Pretoria.24
F or instance, it has been argued, citing Botswana’s experience as an exam ple, 
tha t the Scandinavian countries are readier to  assist a ‘m ore independently* 
aligned Lesotho. Lesotho has also received favourable treatm ent from  the 
U N D P  as one o f the twenty-five least developed countries, and  one o f the six 
hard-core cases singled out for special attention; and its position has beqn 
strengthened by its m ore critical attitude towards apartheid. T h e  African 
Developm ent Bank specifically includes as one o f its four criteria in selection o f 
projects for assistance, the reduction o f dependence on South Africa,25 a criterion
24. ‘ Lesotho sees freedom in a id’, Rand Daily Mail> 6 July 1972, p. 3.
25. Another criterion front which Lesotho benefits is its ‘landlockcdness’. See Lesotho 
Donor Conference, Eleventh session: External resources, Maseru, April 1975, p. 3.
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which would lose m uch o f its m eaning if  Lesotho appeared to concur in its 
dependence. Furtherm ore, by distancing itself from South Africa, Lesotho 
makes itself a more attractive aid target for those W estern cou ntries wishing to 
make a gesture to counter the adverse impression o f continuing close economic 
tics with South Africa. Finally, an im portant justification built into m any a 
project request involves the urgent need to reduce dependence on South Africa. 
T h e  following is an extract from  such a project m em orandum :
. . .  because o f South Africa’s political stance vis-a-vis African peoples, and as 
a necessary means to internal development, it is essential for Lesotho to lower 
its dependence through economic development w ithin the nation, and to 
develop additional bonds with other African nations. T o  accomplish these 
ends, strict economic criteria cannot be decisive as such goals generally 
require some level o f economic subsidy . .  .26 
W hile the request that less than economic criteria be applied is im portant, the 
seriousness o f  the desire for reduced dependence should not be underestim ated; 
and the im pact o f the argum ent would be seriously underm ined by Lesotho 
m aintaining over-friendly ties w ith the Republic.
Finally, w ith tim e, Lesotho’s leaders learnt that in their original evaluation 
they had underestim ated their own room for manoeuvre, and exaggerated their 
vulnerability: they had open to them  just a few m ore options, and Pretoria rather 
fewer than  they had initially appreciated. In  a sense the country’s extrem e 
weakness provided a m odicum  o f protection: M aseru found itself w ith an 
unexpected though lim ited am ount o f  leverage deriving from  South Africa’s 
wish to break out of isolation and establish contacts with Black Africa. Any 
intervention o f an overly crude nature would serve to hinder these efforts: 
Lesotho therefore constituted something o f a test case for South Africa’s 
projected image o f a non-interfering, helpful neighbour. T hus possibilities 
such as invasion or blockade or cutting electrical power were excluded, while the 
chance o f Pretoria initiating large-scale cuts in the em ploym ent of Basotho 
seemed to recede steadily. T he inevitably grave consequences of such a move 
— including possible mass starvation and violence— would not serve any South 
African foreign policy objective. M oreover, w ith M alawi’s decision in  1974 to 
withdraw  its 118,000 m iners from  South Africa (recruitm ent is recommencing, 
however), growing uncertainty over the fu ture supply o f labour from  M ozam ­
bique (already reduced) and Zimbabwe (after independence)27 the need for 
workers from Lesotho seemed to be growing.
Lesotho’s leaders also learnt to distinguish the interests o f the Anglo- 
American Corporation from  those o f V orster’s G overnm ent, and to realize that
26. Kingdom of Lesotho, Preparatory memorandum on a programme for development of 
Lesotho air transport (Maseru: Central Planning and Development Office, January 1974), 
pp. 1 and 3.
27. See, for a discussion on the short and long term demands for labour from Lesotho, 
C. Perrings, Gold and migrancy in the South African political economy, National University 
o f Lesotho, Faculty of Social Sciences Staff Seminar, Paper No. 7, October 1977.
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the latter would have to overcome the opposition o f  the form er to  any steps 
dam aging to mine production. D e Beers’ investm ent o f  over R30 m illion in  the 
L etseng-la-Terai diam ond m ine (the largest capital investm ent in  th e  country’s 
history) juxtaposed w ith P retoria’s refusal to  become involved in  the M alibam atso 
scheme, and  the  presence o f  an  Anglo-Am erican official representative in  
M aseru , as com pared to  the lack o f  a  South African G overnm ent delegation o f  
any kind, seem illustrative o f  this point. All this is not to  suggest th a t Lesotho’s 
security  in  regard to  labour is perm anently assured, and  in  the  second h a lf  o f 
1977 South African officials began indeed to  m urm ur th reats on this subject.
Jonathan was encouraged in  this new assesm ent by the  example o f  Botswana 
w hich had clearly and  consistently distanced itself from  the South A frican  
G overnm ent (bu t no t from  its private sector). In  consequence it  had  w on 
A frican acceptance, w ithout suffering any dam aging repercussions. T h u s 
Lesotho’s Prim e M inister began to  test the ground, little by little, finding th a t 
the  occasional chastisem ents w hich were V orster’s m ain response d id  him  no  
h arm ; on the  contrary, they generally assisted his ends. Already underw ay, this 
tren d  was reinforced by the  events o f April 1974 which saw the regional balance 
o f power tilt markedly against the white regimes, and by those o f  June 1976 
inside South Africa itself. 1
IV
H aving suggested reasons for Lesotho’s altered  standpoint, it is necessary to 
move on to  the second principal purpose o f this article: nam ely, an  analysis o f  
the  content o f the change. T h is  will be done by isolating the  distinguishable 
(though closely interrelated) com ponents o f  the  m odification o f policy.
As will emerge from  the  discussion which follows, m uch o f the  content o f  the  
change is confined to  the  verbal rather than  th e  concrete; nevertheless, the  
rhetoric o f  Lesotho’s spokesmen is in  itself deserving o f com m ent. F rom  th e  
quiet, formal, even somewhat reluctant expressions o f  opposition to  South  
Africa, usually attached as an adjunct to the  principal point on m aintaining close 
ties w ith the Republic, one observes, from  late 1970 onwards, a steady increase 
in  hostile com ment. Having tested itself w ith early attacks on th e  Sm ith regim e 
and  Portuguese colonialism, M aseru  began to  issue warnings on alternatives 
to  peaceful change in South Africa in direr term s, introducing into its vocabulary 
previously absent words like * violence ’, * force ’ or ‘ chaos T h e  only alternative, 
Jonathan said in  August 1972, w ould be ‘serious confrontation’ and  violence;28 
while at the U N  in 1973 Foreign M inister Peete Pecte spoke o f  racial violence, 
giving notice that soon ‘only resort to  force w ould be le ft’.28 /
Similarly, reference to  the practices and implications o f  apartheid  becam e 
harsher. In  1972, for example, Lesotho’s delegate to  the U N  G eneral Assem bly’s, 
Legal Com mittee spoke o f the political dem ands o f black people in South Africa
28. ‘Revive dialogue, warns Jonathan. “ Only alternative is serious confrontation” ' 
(Interview with Stanley U ys), Sunday Times, 20 August 1972, p. 6.
29. ‘Lesotho presses its attack on apartheid’, The Star, 3 October 1973, p. 27.
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being suppressed by state authorities using violence, intim idation and ‘utm ost 
b rutality  to terrorize’ them .30 A high point o f invective was reached in  Foreign 
M inister Kotsokoane’s speech to the U N  in 1974 (in which he described South 
Africa as the sort o f country where whites killed blacks by forcing m ethylated 
spirits down their throats)—the tone o f which was reported  as having caused a 
stir even among African delegates.31 A final example is provided by Foreign 
M inister C. D . M olapo’s description o f apartheid before the Security Council in  
D ecem ber 1976:
T h e  system enslaves, degrades, debases and dehumanizes the black m an . .  . 
a system which, in desperation, unleashes its most sophisticated guns and 
weapons and brutally m urders innocent defenceless schoolchildren in cold 
b lo o d . .  ,32
A second indicator o f change may be discerned in Lesotho’s voting in the U N  
General Assembly. U ntil the 1972 session Lesotho had generally rem ained 
absent from , or abstained, on, voting on the m ost strongly an ti-South  A frican 
resolutions. F rom  1972 onw ard, however, this was no longer true. F or 
example, in  1971 the  Lesotho delegation absented itself during voting on the  
eight-part resolution (2775 A -H ) covering topics such as an arm s em bargo on 
South Africa, apartheid in sport, establishm ent o f Bantustans, etc., while in 1972 
it voted in  favour o f five out o f six parts o f a roughly equivalent resolution 
(2923 A -F ). By assigning different values to each o f  the four voting alternatives 
(for, against, abstention, absence); totalling the values on all resolutions on 
which voting was recorded; and then transferring the totals into percentages, it is 
possible to  establish an indicative m easurem ent o f  hostility towards the white 
regimes as reflected in voting patterns. T h e  results o f such an exercise for 
Zam bia, Botswana, Malawi and Lesotho are as follows:
Zambia Botswana M alaw i Lesotho
1971 100% 89-22% 40-95% 65-22%
1972 100% 95-59% 41-18% 95-59%
W hereas the others’ levels o f hostility rem ained fairly constant, Lesotho’s 
showed a very marked swing upwards, reaching the level o f Botswana and 
approaching that o f  Zam bia.33
T h e th ird  area o f significant change concerned ‘dialogue’ and ‘d e ten te’. 
Jonathan was one o f the first African Heads o f G overnm ent to speak in favour
30. ‘Lesotho: freedom men not terrorists\ The S tar , 23 November 1972, p. 2.7.
31. C. Legum, Africa contemporary record. Annual survey and documents, 1974-1975 
(London, 1975), p. B377.
32. ‘Lesotho case at the Security Council’, Statement by Hon. C. D . M olapo, M inister 
of Foreign Affairs— 21st December 1976, in Lesotho's case and U .N .O . decision on the 
closed border posts by the Republic of South Africa (Maseru: Department o f Information 
and Broadcasting, 1976), p. 6. Also J. R. L. Kotsokoane’s speech on the death of Steve 
Biko, ‘The torch of freedom ’, Maseru, September 1977.
33. D. Hirschmann, Southern African voting patterns in the United Nations General 
Assembly, 1971 and 1972, Johannesburg: South African Institute o f International Affairs, 
August 1973.
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o f  contact and peaceful coexistence, and he was the first to visit South Africa, 
meeting both Vcrwoerd and Vorster. Between 1965 and 1971 he expended 
considerable political energy in fostering this cause. At the OAU summit in  
July 1971 Lesotho was one o f  the few countries to argue and vote in favour o f 
dialogue. Its delegate commented:
" i ..' '
T o s i^y that South Africa must first have dialogue with Africans in their own 
country is to argue in  circles. Our aim is to promote just such a dialogue.3,1
T h e final major initiative was the convening o f the so-called ‘dialogue club’ in 
Maseru in  October that year (during the sixth independence celebrations) which 
gave the South African Minister o f  Education an opportunity to meet repre­
sentatives o f  pro-dialogue African Governments. October 1971 was also the 
time o f  Jonathan’s first strong public attack on apartheid and appears to mark the 
commencement o f  his growing disillusionment with dialogue as a means o f  
encouraging change. ' , >
In  March 1972  ^ the Lesotho Government appealed to African countries 
considering closer contact with Pretoria, particularly the Ivory Coast, to await a 
joint O AU approach on the matter.35 In  August the same year Jonathan stated 
that Pretoria was using dialogue merely to maintain contact with black Africa;33 
and in October (at the . seventh independence celebrations) he blamed South  
Africa’s continuing policy o f  discrimination for the collapse o f  dialogue.37
T he extent o f  the reversal on this issue manifested itself in early 1975 (during 
the period referred to by the South African authorities and press as ‘detente’). 
Whereas Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana, all regarded as far 
more antagonistic than Lesotho towards the South African Government, 
supported a strategy o f  negotiation with Vorster, Lesotho opposed it (making it 
the only one in southern Africa and one o f  the few in Africa to do so). In  
comparison with the 1971 statement on internal dialogue (quoted above) Foreign 
Minister Kotsokoanc strongly urged Africa to avoid all contact with Vorster’s 
Government until the South African authorities began talk with the liberation 
movements inside South Africa.33
In line with.its changing attitude to dialogue, the Lesotho Government’s view 
o f  the role o f  liberation movements in southern Africa has also been modified. 
In the early years o f  independence, Jonathan was, for a num ber o f reasons, 
reluctant to indicate any support at all for violence or for the movements con­
cerned. The OAU Liberation Committee had previously alienated him by 
expressing its preference for the B C P; South African refugees in Lesotho were
34. C. Legum , Africa contemporary record. Annual survey and documents, 1971-J972  
(London, 1972), p. A76. '■ -••• ,
35. ‘Lesotho stopped dialogue’, Rand Daily M ail, 6 March 1972, p. 1 and ‘N o  Lesotho
“sabotage” on dialogue*, The S tar, 6 March 1972, p. 11.
36. ‘Revive dialogue, warns Jonathan . . . ’, op. cit.
37. ‘ Jonathan flays discrimination*, The Star, 4 October 1972, p. 1.
38. . D . Hirschmann, ‘ Southern Africa: ddtente ?’, Journal of M odem  African Studies,
14, 1, 1976, p. 119.
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in closer contact with, and more supportive of, the BCP and he was therefore 
wary o f  any move which might extend their influence; he assessed the chances of 
a violent overthrow of the South African regime as nil; and finally, he under­
stood that one action which would definitely elicit a harsh response from Pretoria 
would be to let guerrilla forces operate from his country. Thus he used to argue 
that non-violent measures alone could bring about constructive change, and that 
military strategies were doomed to failure in view o f the Republic’s military 
strength.
However, as his hopes for peaceful change dimmed, so his views on the 
liberation movements altered. When asked, in 1972, about his attitude to 
‘guerrilla groups’ he responded:
In my mind a guerrilla is someone who seeks by unconstitutional means to 
topple a government when the constitutional means are in existence. In  the 
case of white ruled Southern Africa these would not be guerrilla groups but 
liberation movements frustrated by the absence o f constitutional machinery 
into resorting to violence.30
He v ent on to express clear support for them, as did Lesotho’s representative, 
later that year, to the U N  General Assembly’s Legal Committee.40 Further 
evidence o f  Lesotho’s changed approach came, also in 1972, when the country’s 
Ambassador backed the decision o f  the General Assembly’s Trusteeship  
Committee to admit African, liberation movements as observers,41 much to 
Pretoria’s chagrin. In April 1973, Jonathan told the newly established Interim  
National Assembly that Lesotho would not cease to give moral or any other 
possible support ‘to our fellow men in the liberation movements.42 Finally, in 
1977, Foreign Minister C. D . Molapo appeared to go further than any previous 
spokesman in terms o f an acceptance o f  violent change: the effects, he said, 
would be devastating, but a ‘better South Africa would emerge from the 
embers’.43
A closely related shift can be discerned on the question o f arms sales to the 
Republic. At the OAU summit in Addis Ababa in September 1970 Lesotho 
and Malawi were the only countries to abstain on a resolution condemning arms 
sales to South Africa; and in January 1971, at the Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers’ Conference in Singapore Jonathan concurred in Britain’s right to sell 
arms to Pretoria. However, as his disillusionment with Vorster and his sym­
pathy for liberation movements grew, he recast his views on arms sales. In the 
speech to the Interim National Assembly (mentioned above) he hit out at the
39. ‘Revive dialogue, warns J o n a th a n ...’, op. cit. Also ‘Lesotho stcun terroristc 
openlik’, Die Vaderland, Johannesburg, 9 September 1972, p. 1.
40. * Lesotho: freedom men not terrorists’, op. cit.
41. ‘Lesotho reasons for U N  m ove’, The Star, 13 October 1972, p. 1: and ‘Terrorists: 
U N  decision pleases Lesotho’, The Star, 13 October 1972, p. 25.
42. 'Jonathan hits at white south arms sales', The Star, 30 April 1973, p. 1, and, 
‘Jonarhan backs “liberation movements'” , Rand Daily M ail, 1 May 1973.
43. Lesotho Weekly, 16 April 1977, p. 1.
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Western powers for selling weapons to the white minprity regimes which served 
only ‘to perpetuate racial oppression and retard political progress o f the Black 
majorities’.44 , . . . . ,
A reversal o f policy may be observed in the area o f  official Governmental 
contact, specifically at three levels: high-key, high-level political contact; 
exchange o f diplomats; and seconded technical assistance personnel. Jonathan’s 
early meetings with Verwoerd and Vorster seemed to pressage regular visits o f  
this nature. These did not eventuate, and it was not until 1974 (this particular 
meeting having been postponed for about two years)45 that a somewhat low-key 
one-day meeting took place between Jonathan and Vorster. That it took place 
at all appears to have been a result o f the Lesotho Prime M inister’s need to 
raise a few pressing issues: for example, oil supplies, disturbances among mine 
workers and, possibly, South Africa’s alleged assistance to BCP refugees who 
fled after an unsuccessful series o f  attacks on police stations in the north o f  
Lesotho. Despite a relatively warm communique, Maseru intended the 
occasion to be an isolated occurrence, not a signal for improved relations. At 
the Ministerial level too, visits came to a virtual halt. After Lesotho’s Prime 
Minister had attacked apartheid at the 1972 independence celebrations (the 
second year running in which he had done so) South Africa ceased attending the 
celebrations.46
T he question o f  diplomatic exchange is also illustrative. Initially Lesotho  
agreed in principle (and it was Said that South African officials had been to 
Maseru to choose a site for an embassy) but then, step by step, the Lesotho 
Government edged away from such a move. First, it indicated its reluctance by 
expressing concern about possible humiliation o f Lesotho diplomats in South 
Africa. By the time Malawi’s experience proved these fears to be exaggerated—  
if  not unfounded— Lesotho had raised ‘a far more fundamental objection’, 
demanding that relations should be as between any other two states. ‘What 
they m ean’, observed the South African journalist, Hennie Serfontcin, ‘is that 
they are not interested in their diplomatic representatives being given special 
facilities while a couple o f hundred thousand Lesotho citizens are exposed to 
apartheid’.47 When in September 1973 (shortly after the Carletonville mine 
shootings) a member o f a small opposition party moved that Lesotho should 
establish diplomatic tics with South Africa, almost every Member o f Parliament 
walked out in protest,48 and the issue has not been raised seriously since.
44. ‘Jonathan hits at white south arms sales’, op. cit.
45. See for example ‘No date for SA Lesotho m eeting’, The Star, 16 Novem ber 1972, 
p. 27.
46. In 1975 South African Foreign Minister Hilgard Muller paid an official visit to 
Lesotho. His successor, R. F. Botha, visited Lesotho soon after his appointment, ar his 
own request, and again in 1978 to secure the release o f two South Africans alleged to be 
BOSS agents.
47. ‘ SA relations with Lesotho near breaking po i n t . . . * ,  op. c it.'  also ‘Treat us 
properly— Jonathan’, The S tar , 21 May 1973, p. 25.
48. ‘ Lesotho snubs SA over diplomatic tie s’, Rand Daily M ail, 22 September 1973, 
p. 4.
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O n the th ird  level, Lesotho revoked its policy o f willing acceptance o f seconded 
South African personnel. A fter independence the Lesotho G overnm ent 
welcomed large num bers o f South Africans to bolster the country’s civil service, 
placing some in  positions o f great sensitivity; for example, C hief Justice, 
Electoral Officer and H ead o f Inform ation.'11' By the early 1970s this flow was 
being reversed and the  positions vacated were being filled principally, bu t not 
only, by advisers attached to U N  agencies. T he departure o f the last group 
(those in  the legal field) was significant since the two countries share the Rom an 
D utch  law system. Lesotho thus indicated tha t even in an area in which South 
African advisers would be m ore knowledgeable than those from  other countries, 
their assistance would not be sought.
N oting all this, it should be stressed that the course o f reducing contact has 
been lim ited to the th ree levels m entioned. For example, Lesotho has a labour 
representative in  South Africa in accordance w ith a 1973 labour agreem ent, 
participates in Customs U nion m eetings, m ounts missions to the Republic on 
m atters o f im portance and at the private level encourages interest in Lesotho 
am ong South Africans in  every way possible, be they potential investors, 
tourists or consultants.
A fu rthe r example is provided by the  m ore striden t dem ands for the re tu rn  
o f the ‘conquered te rrito ry ’. Both m ajor political pan ics have consistently 
included the re tu rn  o f  the land in  their platform s, bu t in the early years of 
independence the  BN P was very restrained about its claims. L ater, however, 
M aseru decided to intensify its dem ands, by challenging Pretoria m ore deter­
m inedly, and to internationalize the issue by raising it at the U N , and elsewhere. 
In  June 1973 Lesotho requested a U N  legal adviser to help prepare for negotia­
tions, w hich, according to Foreign M inister M olapo, South Africa ‘unilaterally 
te rm inated ’,60 while in January 1975 Jonathan declared his intention to press 
his claim at the U N  and, if  he m ade no progress there, to take the issue to the 
International Court o f Justice.
T h e  exact area which the Lesotho G overnm ent has in m ind is not clear. T he 
land most consistently referred  to as the ‘conquered te rr ito ry ’ consists o f that 
taken from  the Basotho following the 1866 Scqiti W ar which ended in the Peace 
o f the Sorghum  and ultimately in the Convention of Aliwal N orth  o f 12 February 
1869. It includes the present Orange Free State towns o f  Fouriesburg, 
Ficksburg, Clocolan, Ladybrand, Hobhousc and W epencr, in a belt running 
from  north  to south approxim ately th irty  kilom etres west o f Lesotho’s present 
western boundary, coinciding roughly with the land cast o f the Caledon River 
watershed.
Before this, however, there had been a long period o f uncertainty and conflict 
concerning division o f land involving claims and counterclaims, the movement
49. Weisfelder, op. cit., p. 51. He gives a number o f 67 South Africans serving under 
this programme in 1969.
50. ‘Lesotho’s case at the Security Council’, op. cit., p. 7,
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o f  peoples in and out o f  the area, differing (and differing versions of) chiefs’ 
allegiances to M oshoeshoe, diverging interpretations o f ‘ sales * o f land, raids and 
counterraids and on occasion the outbreak o f war. T h e  period was interspersed 
w ith arbitrations and disputed dem arcations such as the G rey L ine (1858, 
following Senekal’s war o f 1856); the W arden L ine (1849); the Southey Line, 
which was not im plem ented (1848); the M aitland L ine (1845); and the earliest, 
the  N apier L ine (1843) which constituted a T reaty  between M oshoeshoe and 
the  Cape G overnm ent.51 >
I t  would appear now th a t the Lesotho G overnm ent is expanding its claims 
beyond the 1869 line to the N apier L ine, and fu rthe r to areas long inhabited by 
Basotho. In  February  1977, for example, Jonathan extended his dem ands to 
include m ost o f  the Orange Free State as well as other land ‘fraudulently  taken 
during the w ars’.52
T h e  dispute is becoming fu rthe r complicated by the involvem ent (or potential 
involvem ent) o f three o f South Africa’s Bantustans in  these claims. L esotho’s 
expanded claims would include' T haba N chu, a small island o f land in the 
Orange F ree State which constitutes a part o f distant Bophuthatswana. T h e  
validity o f the claim has long been disputed, and depends largely on the extent 
to  which C hief M oroka o f the Rolong, who arrived in the area in  1833, became 
and  rem ained a vassal o f M oshoeshoe.53 Lesotho has no clear claim to Qwaqwa 
(a m inute Bantustan for Sotho, situated on its north-eastern  border), bu t there 
are two points o f possible conflict. An unclearly defined section o f  the border 
has recently become of m ore im portance since Qwaqwa com menced investing 
large am ounts o f capital in a ski resort situated in what was previously a relatively 
inaccessible and economically insignificant area. F u rth e r, Qwaqwa lays claim 
to the same ‘conquered te rrito ry ’ as does Lesotho (as also to additional districts 
around H arrism ith and Bethlehem , and in  the T ran sk d ).54 Finally, Lesotho 
has laid claim to two (of the eleven) districts o f the Transkei, nam ely N orth  
M aluti (formerly M atatiele) and  South M aluti (formerly M ount Fletcher). 
Basotho have occupied these areas (once known as Nom ansland) for over a 
hundred years, their num bers having been boosted in the 1880s when, following 
the G un W ar, certain !loyal’ chiefs (notably George Tlali Moshoeshoe) and 
their followers were placed there by the Cape G overnm ent.55
T hus Foreign M inister Kotsokoane w arned the U N  in Novem ber 1975 o f a 
confrontation between South Africa and Lesotho over the border issue, and
51. I am indebted to David Ambrose o f the National University o f Lesotho for discussing 
this period o f Lesotho’s history. See also P. Sanders, Mochoeshoe. Chief of the Sotho 
(London, 1975), particularly maps on pages 238 and 242.
52. ‘Jonathan claims O F S ’, The S tar , 7 February 1977, p. 5.
53. Sanders, op. cit., pp. 50, 52, and 63-5.
54. See M. F. Ntja, ‘The Basotho outside our borders— ways o f incorporating them in 
the development o f Qwaqwa ’ (this is a translation o f the Sesotho title), M aru, N o. 3, 
August 1974, p. 10.
55. These claims have aggravated the already strained relations between Lesotho and 
the Transkei, and elicited angry responses from Matanzima; sec ‘ Kaiser hits at Lcabua’, 
Eastern Province Herald, Port Elizabeth, 17 October 1977.
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added that the interposition o f  the Bantustan borders would aggravate the 
dispute fu rther and could lead to a racial holocaust;50 and in D ecem ber 1976, 
Foreign M inister M olapo, in pu tting  his case on the Transkei to the Security 
Council, noted tha t South Africa’s cession o f large tracts o f this disputed land 
to the Bantustans ‘complicated the already difficult border p rob lem s’.57
Finally, note should be taken o f a redirection o f  policy which has m ost 
recently  reached a climax and attracted  international attention. T h e  Lesotho 
G overnm ent has always indicated some opposition to apartheid, and to the 
Bantustan aspect o f the system (although, as has been a central them e o f this 
article, the intensity of the hostility has markedly increased). N evertheless, an 
assessment o f some o f the personalities serving as C hief M inisters in the early 
1970s, particularly Buthclezi, led Jonathan in a 1972 interview to rem ark that 
in  his view they would yet play a positive role in the struggle against discrim ina­
tion. ‘ I am inclined to th in k ’, he said, ‘that they can do som ething w ithin the 
separate development system, which is now the only area in which they have 
some freedom  to express them selves’.58
As this optim ism  about peaceful change and the potentially positive role o f  
the Bantustan leaders both faded, and as Africa began to forge a com mon 
approach in preparation for the T ranskci’s ‘independence’, so L esotho’s 
opposition to the Bantustans became unequivocal. In  an interview  early in 
1976, Foreign M inister M olapo stated the principal issue involved in L esotho’s 
in tended refusal to recognize the T ranskei’s independence: his G overnm ent 
was opposed to apartheid, and the granting o f  ‘ independence ’ to the Bantustans 
was an essential part o f that policy.59
T here  was little h in t then o f the pitch o f animosity tha t would be reached 
between Pretoria and M aseru over this issue. Im m ediately after T ranskei’s 
‘ independence* Lesotho’s representative at the U N  accused South Africa o f 
closing the three border posts— Ramatscliso’s G ate, Qacha’s N ek and T ele 
Bridge— connecting Lesotho and the Transkei, in breach o f a 1973 agreem ent 
between the two countries. He asserted that, in consequence, Basotho living 
in certain m ountain areas would suffer considerably and the country’s earnings 
fi om customs revenue w ould be reduced. T he African G roup at the  U N  wrote 
to the Secretary General backing Lesotho’s case, while the South African 
Foreign M inister wrote denying it.00 On 21 D ecem ber Lesotho’s Foreign 
M inister made a full statem ent to the Security Council. He undertook, despite
56. Africa Research Bulletin, 12, 10, 1975, p. 3783 C.
57. ‘Lesotho’s case at the Security Council’, op. cit., p. 7.
58. ‘Revive dialogue, warns Jonathan . . . ’, op. cit.
59. R. J. Southall, ‘ Lcsotho/Transkci: what kind o f relationship?’, Africa Report, 21, 
5, 1976, pp. 41-2. Sec also R. J. Southall, Commentary: Transkei, Africa and apartheid—  
the implications of international recognition (Umtata: Paper to Conference o f  South African 
Institute o f International Affairs, 1976), particularly pp. 16-18.
60. See letter dated 12 November 1976 to U N  Secretary General from the Chairman 
o f the African Group and Permanent Representative of Libya; letter dated 16 Novem ber 
l'>76 to the U N  Secretary General from the South African M inister for Foreign Affairs, 
D r the Hon, Hilgard M uller.
the ‘dire and profound consequences’ o f South 'Africa's action to his country’s 
political and economic life, that Lesotho would ‘not be cowed’ into recognising 
the Transkei; and requested about 380 million in assistance to strengthen its 
capacity to resist.01 The Council adopted a resolution commending this stand, 
condemning South Africa’s action and calling on all states and U N  agencies to 
provide material and other aid to Lesotho.62
Colin Legum visited the border and claimed on the basis o f his observation 
that Lesotho had hoaxed the U N , for he saw no obstacle whatever to the free 
flow o f goods and persons.03 As Lesotho’s Solicitor General and Minister o f  
Information and Broadcasting, amongst others, have pointed out, Legum ’s 
conclusions are too simple because a number o f  very serious inconveniences 
have indeed resulted.04 Yet it is clear that the impression o f  something akin to 
blockade created by certain o f Lesotho’s claims was exaggerated.
The exact accuracy o f the claims is, however, not o f central concern here. 
What is relevant is the manner in which Lesotho handled the issue, and the 
lengths to which it was f il l in g  to go to demonstrate to the world its antipathy 
to apartheid and the Bantustans. In so doing, Lesotho was able— if  only 
temporarily—to re-establish its position nearer the centre stage o f  southern 
African affairs (from which it has been steadily removed over the past few years, 
in particular by its exclusion from meetings o f the five front-line states), with 
Minister Molapo arguing that the border closure had turned Lesotho into a 
‘confrontation state*. Further, taking advantage o f  worldwide rejection o f  
Transkei ‘independence’, it was able to draw international attention to its open  
antagonism to Vorster’s Government, to its own vulnerability, and to its courage 
in the circumstances (‘we shall not be c ow ed . . .  and shall never succumb to 
blackmail and distortion ,).os Finally, by pointing out the substantial cost o f  
carrying out U N  resolutions on the Transkei, it was able effectively to turn the 
issue into an urgent plea for large-scale international aid.
V
Reassembling these components, it remains necessary to place the overall 
policy modification in some perspective. Whatever approach is adopted in this 
regard, certain observations should be generally acknowledged.
First, it is clear that over the last six or seven years Lesotho’s policy makers 
have learnt much about the practices and realities o f diplomacy. They have
61. ‘Lesotho’s case at the Security Council’, op. cit., particularly pp. 8 and 10.
62. Resolution 402 (1976), adopted by Security Council at its 1982nd meeting on 22 
Decem ber 1976. ' ;
63. C. Legum, ‘Proof of Lesotho’s U N  hoax’, Rand D aily M ail, 14 January 1977, p. 9,
64. ‘A statement by the Honourable M inister o f Information and Broadcasting Morena 
Makhoala Lerotholi on the attempted falsification of the closure of the South Eastern 
border of Lesotho by the Government o f the Republic o f South Africa’, in Lesotho's case 
and U.N.O. decision.. ., op. cit., pp. 17-22 (subtitled ‘ Colin Legum ’s futile drive to 
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developed, a shrewd assessment of costs and benefits o f alternative moves aqd 
o f what they can and cannot get away with. T hey  have also come to appreciate 
that interstate relations are multidim ensional and require no strict consistency: 
they can be carried out at many, varied, often contradictory and changing levels.
A second area of broad agreem ent would be that C hief Jonathan has em ployed 
his foreign policy—particularly the recasting o f it— to the advantage o f hirqsclf, 
his Party  an?l the ruling political-adm inistrative-business class. Externally, he 
has im proved his own and his G overnm ent’s image, and domestically he has 
w rested from  the BCP its monopoly on anti-apartheid pronouncem ents. T h e  
change in policy has proved an effective buttress to M aseru’s aid objectives; and 
while the overall impact o f aid has not been m easured, it does bolster the 
B N P’s efforts to win acceptance. Augm ented G overnm ent revenues: (discussed 
above) have allowed for both a steady growth in the num ber o f civil service 
jobs and an across-the-board raise in civil service salaries; and  the small 
professional and commercial segments of this class have benefited from  the 
greater am ounts of money available inside Lesotho.
A th ird  point—m ore contestable than the previous one— is that in achieving 
the above advantages for those around him , Jonathan has at the very least not 
sacrificed the interests o f  the m igrant workers and, therefore,, directly and 
indirectly, those o f the large majority o f Lesotho’s non-privileged classes. 
W hile improvements are not attributable to any measures o f the Lesotho 
G overnm ent, it can claim to have overseen a period in which the num ber o f 
Basotho able to find work,in the Republic has grown steadily, and their salaries 
have risen markedly. Deepening dependence on foreign interests, particularly  
those in the Republic o f South Africa, provides no cause for acclaim. Y et, 
until M aseru conceives a strategy able to offer domestic em ploym ent and  
sustenance inside the country, the only foreign policy option appears to be the 
m ost advantageous use o f that dependence.
Fourthly, it will be widely acknowledged that there is very little likelihood o f 
Lesotho significantly influencing developments in southern Africa. Its size 
(it is small by any measure), geographical predicam ent, economic fragility and 
dependence preclude it from  playing a major ro le : as its economy is peripheral, 
so too is its influence. T hus one is observing a G overnm ent operating from  a 
very weak base, w ithin tight constraints and with minimal potential im pact on 
the subcontinent.
N evertheless—and this would be the fifth point—because o f its location in 
southern  Africa, any evaluation o f Lesotho’s foreign policy will include a test o f 
its influence beyond the country’s borders. Elsewhere, the foreign policy o f 
.most governm ents in similar economic and political circumstances would not be 
seriously subjected to such a test. In  this region, however, the criterion of 
external im pact—specifically on white m inority rule—will inevitably be included 
in  the assessment.
On this particular question—namely the effects o f Lesotho’s change in policy
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on South Africa—it is not suggested that there will be any consensus. In  fact 
one could conceive o f a debate on at least two levels.
T h e  first w ould proceed on the basis o f an assum ption tha t in South Africa 
capitalism and apartheid are closely interlinked and m utually reinforcing. T h e  
im pact o f  any policy em anating from  M aseru would be judged in term s o f its 
effects on the operation and strength  o f private enterprise as well as on govern­
m ent policies. Proponents o f  this view would be likely to dismiss entirely the 
pronouncem ents o f the Lesotho G overnm ent as aim ed at nothing m ore than  
legitimizing the BN P and  the interests it serves inside Lesotho. T hey  w ould 
argue that the total effect o f its overall policy measures (both domestic and 
foreign) has been to raise substantially the num ber of workers flowing to the 
mines, industries and farms o f the Republic, so reinforcing the m igrant labour 
system and bolstering capitalism and in tu rn  the position o f the South African 
N ational Party. >. ■ .
A second level o f debate would be concerned w ith apartheid as a relatively 
distinct phenom enon,',and would revolve around the question o f w hether 
Jonathan’s G overnm ent has done anything to influence or weaken the position 
o f  V orster’s Governm ent. H ere a principal argum ent w ould be tha t, w hen all 
is said and done, Lesotho’s leaders have not ventured beyond rhetoric into any 
substantive action.
Against these views, one could start by reiterating the Lesotho G overnm ent’s 
predicam ent, arguing that in  the circumstances, attention should be focused on  
w hat has rather than  what has not been achieved. Lesotho’s change o f  policy 
in  the early 1970s surprised many observers—and V orstcr’s G overnm ent—and  
the extent to which it was prepared to go to dem onstrate its hostility to P retoria 
elicited further surprise (some o f it in M aseru itself), for example, in expressing 
public support for liberation movements and opposition to the T ranskei’s 
‘independence’.
F urther, the implied equating o f rhetoric w ith ineffectiveness is not completely 
valid. Obviously, many of the statem ents from  M aseru make little im pression 
in South Africa: in many cases that is not their intended target. Yet, Lesotho 
has played a role in  internationalizing aspects o f Pretoria’s rule, forcing the 
world com m unity to take note o f  events which m ight otherwise have beep 
overlooked. Insofar as Lesotho provides a ‘test case’ for P retoria’s intentions 
in  Africa, Jonathan’s handling o f relations w ith the Republic since 1971 have 
provided a setback to the energetic and expensive efforts by South A frica’s 
Foreign and Inform ation M inistries to project an image o f a helpful and non­
interfering neighbour. Judging from  V orstcr’s anger, the Lesotho delegate to  
the OAU did indeed contribute to the case against his 1974-5 detente offensive. 
F urtherm ore, Lesotho spokesmen have dem onstrated, th rough  reference to  
specific incidents, the consequences o f South African policies on non-South  
African citizens, particularly those o f Lesotho and  neighbouring states; they 
have clam oured for the re tu rn  o f the conquered territo ry ; they have charged
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Pretoria with closure o f an international border in breach o f an agreem ent; and 
they have warned of a racial holocaust encompassing the whole region. In  so 
doing, they have helped detract from  Pretoria’s (already widely discounted) 
legal argum ent that apartheid presents no th reat to international peace and is 
therefore a domestic m atter not falling under the jurisdiction o f  the U N . 
Finally, Lesotho has played a part in damaging, it seems irreparably, South 
Africa’s T ranskei stratagem.
In  pointing out these examples, one has to be wary o f overstating the case; 
and obviously a discussion on the lines suggested above only makes sense if  seen 
as part o f a build-up o f international pressure on the Republic. On the other 
hand, observing the very lim ited im pact of far larger powers on developm ents in 
the region, Lesotho’s m odest contribution is w orth a m ention.
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